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The co-movements of nominal exchange rates and short-term interest
rates as the economy is hit by shocks is a potential source of ex post
deviations from uncovered interest rate parity. This paper investi-
gates whether an established model of endogenous monetary policy in
an open economy is capable of explaning the exchange rate risk pre-
mium puzzle. Time series on interest diﬀerentials and exchange rate
changes are generated from the Svensson (2000) model. Uncovered in-
terest rate parity is tested on the simulated data and the β-coeﬃcients
are investigated. For most realistic choices of parameter values, the
β-coeﬃcients are positive but much smaller than the unity value ex-
pected from UIP. It is however also possible to obtain large, negative
β-coeﬃcients if the central bank is engaged in interest rate smoothing.
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11 Introduction
Uncovered interest parity (UIP) implies that the coeﬃcient β from regressing
exchange rate changes on lagged interest diﬀerentials equals +1.N u m e r o u s
empirical studies have reported β−coeﬃcients that are signiﬁcantly negative,
and large. Several surveys point out −3 to −4 as a typical result, see Engel
(1995), or McCallum (1994). Traditional explanations of the deviations from
UIP focus on time varying risk premia and/or systematic forecast errors. It
is probably fair to say that neither approach has been successful in explaining
the empirical failure of UIP. This paper explores a third possibility, namely
that the observed negative relationship between short-term interest rates and
ex post exchange rate changes is a consequence of the response of monetary
policy to shocks.
Tentative evidence suggests that the typical ﬁnding of a negative β−coeﬃcient
is conﬁned to short-term interest rates. The few available studies of UIP
for long-term interest rates report β−coeﬃcients that are positive and of-
ten insigniﬁcantly smaller than unity (Alexius, 2001, Meredith and Chinn,
1998). Short-term interest rates diﬀer from other ﬁnancial assets in that
they constitute the main monetary policy instrument in most industrialized
countries with ﬂexible exchange rates. Both interest rates and exchange rates
are endogenous variables in open economy macro models with endogenous
monetary policy. McCallum (1994), Meredith and Chinn (1998), and Alex-
ius (2000) provide examples of theoretical models where the co-movements
of short-term interest rates and exchange rate changes can produce a neg-
ative relationship between short-term interest rates and ex post exchange
rate changes. However, if this was a general result, the mechanism would be
2present in standard models of endogenous monetary policy and not just in
special cases
In this paper, the Svensson (2000) model of monetary policy in an open
economy is used to generate artiﬁcial time series on exchange rate changes
and interest diﬀerentials. The standard UIP test is applied to the resulting
data sets and the β−coeﬃcients are collected. The model parameters are
then varied in order to (i) investigate what ranges of β−coeﬃcients that
emerges for realistic parameter values and (ii) identify the conditions under
which large, negative β−coeﬃcients can be obtained from the model.
The idea that the negative co-movements of exchange rates changes and
interest rate diﬀerentials could be a consequence of the monetary policy re-
sponse to shocks is originally due to McCallum (1994). He uses a two equa-
tion framework, consisting of a UIP relationship and a monetary policy reac-
tion function, to illustrate his point. Meredith and Chinn (1998) incorporate
this mechanism into an open economy macro model. They calibrate their
model and show that it is capable of generating negative β−coeﬃcients in
standard UIP tests. The results in McCallum (1994) and Meredith and Chinn
(1998) hinge crucially on existence of substantial shocks to the exchange rate
risk premium, which is an exogenous shock in these models. Attempts to
model endogenous exchange rate risk premia have however failed to generate
a risk premium of the required magnitude. Note that whether the monetary
policy response to shocks can explain the observed ex post deviations from
UIP is a separate issue that can be discussed in isolation from the magnitude
of the risk premium shocks. The shocks that monetary policy responds to do
not even have to be shocks to the exchange rate risk premium. For instance,
3Alexius (2000) ﬁnds a negative relationship between interest diﬀerentials and
ex post exchange rate changes as the variables move in response to demand
shocks.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. If it is the en-
dogenous response of monetary policy to shocks that generates negative β-
coeﬃcients in UIP tests, this mechanism should be present not only in models
constructed speciﬁcally for the purpose of explaining the exchange rate risk
premium puzzle, but in open economy macro models in general. The Svens-
son (2000) model is an open economy version of an established framework
for analyzing monetary policy (Rudebusch and Svensson, 1998, Svensson,
1999a and 1999b). Hence, we know that the model is not specially designed
to produced the desired negative relationship between exchange rate changes
and interest diﬀerentials. Second, while Meredith and Chinn (1998) calibrate
their model for one particular set of parameter values, the parameters are
varied systematically in this paper. The conditions under which the model
provides an explanation for the exchange rate risk premium puzzle can then
be delineated. In particular, Meredith and Chinn (1998) assign a very high
variance to the risk premium shocks, which is a well-known way of obtaining
negative β-coeﬃcients in UIP tests (Fama, 1984). Third, while the mod-
els of Meredith and Chinn (1998) and Alexius (2001) are postulated ad hoc,
Svensson (2000) derives the building blocks of his model from microeconomic
foundations. Finally, monetary policy in the Svensson (2000) model does not
merely follow a rule of thumb but is conducted in a forward looking manner,
utilizing all available information to minimize an intertemporal loss function.
The paper is organized as follows. First, the exchange rate risk premium
4puzzle is brieﬂy discussed (Section 2) and the Svensson (2000) open economy
model is presented (Section 3). The heart of the paper is Section 4, where
time series on interest diﬀerentials and exchange rate changes are generated
from the Svensson (2000) model. The standard UIP test is applied to the
simulated data and the β−coeﬃcients are studied for diﬀerent choices of
parameters values. In Section 5, the ﬁndings are analyzed in terms of the
Froot and Frankel (1989) decomposition of the deviations from UIP into parts
due to the presence of risk premia and forecast errors. Section 6 concludes.
2 The puzzle
The standard test of UIP is to regress ex post exchange rate changes on
lagged interest diﬀerentials as in (1) and investigate whether [α,β]e q u a l s
[0, 1]. Alternatively, a constant risk premium α is allowed and only the
hypothesis that β equals unity is tested.
st+1 − st = α + β (it − i
∗
t)+εt+1. (1)
Since expected exchange rate changes are unobservable, (1) is a joint
test of the UIP hypothesis Et∆st+1 = it − i∗
t and the rational expectation
hypothesis st+1 = Et[st+1]+εt+1,w h e r eεt+1 is white noise. If [α,β]6=[0, 1] in
(1), UIP does not hold or the exchange rate expectations are systematically
erroneous. The ex post deviation from UIP in (1), εt+1, can be divided into
ar i s kp r e m i u mrpt+1 and a forecast error νt+1:
εt+1 = rpt+1 + νt+1. (2)
5As shown by Fama (1984), a small (below 0.5) or negative OLS estimate
of β in (1) implies that the variance of the risk premium exceeds the variance
o ft h ee x p e c t e de x c h a n g er a t ec h a n g e :
Var (rpt+1) > Var (Et∆st+1) (3)
For instance, the typical ﬁnding that β equals −3 in (1) requires that the
variance of the risk premium is at least four times as large as the variance of
the expected exchange rate changes (see Meredith, 2000). This is puzzling
because it is diﬃcult to generate risk premia of the required magnitude.
Numerous unsuccessful attempts to model a large and variable exchange
rate risk premium have been made. Hodrick (1989) provides a survey of
this literature.1 The problem is similar to the equity risk premium puzzle of
Mehra and Prescott (1985). For instance, the exchange rate risk premium
in a standard consumption capital asset pricing model equals γCov(st,c t),
where γ is the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient and ct is period t consumption.
Because the variance of consumption is small relative to the deviations from
UIP, consumers have to be implausibly risk averse for this class of models to
generate substantial risk premia.
Several authors argue that the exchange rate risk premium puzzle is not
as puzzling as Fama (1984) and others have made it. For instance, Hodrick
and Srivastava (1986) show that the Lucas (1982) general equilibrium model
is capable of satisfying (3), i.e. may generate risk premia with a variance that
1 A possible exception is De Santis and Gerard (1997, 1998), who are able to predict
a non-trivial portion of the excess returns in foreign exchange markets using GARCH-
models. Other studies have however failed to detect signiﬁcant exchange rate risk premia
in similar models based on time-varying second moments (Giovannini and Jorion, 1989,
Alexius and Sellin, 1999)
6exceeds the variance of the expected exchange rate changes. Meredith (2000)
instead claims that since the empirical failure of UIP is well documented, and
it requires that (3) is satisﬁed, the unobservable exchange rate risk premium
must be large and highly variable. If models have failed to capture this, it is
the models, not the facts, that are to blame. A third possibility is to argue
that while it is diﬃcult to generate a large and highly variable risk premium,
models of expected exchange rate changes have not necessarily been more
successful. Nominal exchange rate changes are notoriously diﬃcult to predict,
especially at the short forecasting horizons that match short-term interest
rates (Meese and Rogoﬀ, 1983). According to equation (3), the variance of
t h er i s kp r e m i u mh a st obel a r g erelativeto the variance of expected exchange
rate changes. This condition can be satisﬁed either if the variance of the risk
p r e m i u mi sl a r g eo ri ft h ev a r i a n c eo fe x p e c t e de x c h a n g er a t ec h a n g e si s
small. If nominal exchange rate changes are completely unpredictable, as
Meese and Rogoﬀ (1983) and others claim, the right hand side of (3) is zero
a n da ni n ﬁnitely small variance of the risk premium is suﬃcient to satisfy
the inequality in (3).
Typically, little is known about expected exchange rate changes. One
of the advantages of using a full scale open economy macro model rather
than a partial equilibrium ﬁnance model is that expected exchange rates
are endogenously determined. It is then possible to analyze the variance of
expected exchange rate changes relative to the variance of the risk premium
and also the covariances between these variables. Froot and Frankel (1989)
derive the following decomposition of the ex post deviations from UIP into
p a r t sa t t r i b u t a b l et ot h ee x c h a n g er a t er i s kp r e m i u m ,βrp, and forecast errors,
7βfe:
βOLS =1− βrp − βfe, (4)
where βfe equals minus the covariance of the forecast errors νt+1 and the
interest diﬀerential:





βrp consists of the variance of the risk premium minus the covariance of
the risk premium and expected exchange rate changes divided by the variance
of the interest diﬀerential:
βrp =[ Var(rpt+1) − Cov(rpt+1,E t∆st+1)]/Var(it − i
∗
t). (6)
All elements of (5) and (6) except the variance of the interest diﬀerentials
are unobservable. They can however be identiﬁed numerically in the simu-
lated data from the Svensson (2000) model. An open economy macro model
can in principle generate negative β−coeﬃcients from any of the terms in (5)
and (6), for instance a negative covariance between expected exchange rate
changes and the risk premium. Partial equilibrium models that focus on the
ﬁrst order conditions of consumers given exogenous stochastic processes for
exchange rates and interest rates do not contain such a potential. On the
other hand, the variance of the exchange rate risk premium is an exogenous
parameter in the Svensson (2000) model. In this paper, we want to investi-
gate the potential of an open economy macro model to generate deviations
from UIP through the variance and covariance terms in (3), (5) and (6).
83T h e m o d e l
The Svensson (2000) model consists of a supply equation, a demand equa-
tion, a UIP relationship and a monetary policy reaction function. Following
Woodford (1996) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), the supply function
in (7) is derived from microfoundations in Svensson (2000):








xt+τ|t denotes the rational expectation of a variable xt+τ conditional on
the information available at t. πt is the inﬂation rate, qt is the real exchange
rate deﬁned as st+p∗
t−pt and εt is a (cost push) supply shock. yt is the output
gap deﬁned as aggregate demand minus the natural output level, yd
t − yn
t .
A c c o r d i n gt o( 7 ) ,c u r r e n ti n ﬂation is a function of lagged inﬂation, expected
inﬂa t i o n ,t h eo u t p u tg a p ,t h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ea n dt h ec o s tp u s hs h o c k .










t+1 is a productivity shock. Hence, there are two diﬀerent supply
shocks, a cost push shock εt and a productivity shock ηn
t .
Demand for domestically produced goods is given by

















t denotes the foreign output gap and ηd
t+1 is an i.i.d. demand shock.
The output gap is a function of the lagged output gap, the foreign output
gap, the real exchange rate, the real interest rate, the demand shock and the
9productivity shock. This aggregate demand equation is derived from (some)
microfoundations in Svensson (2000). The long real interest variable ρt is
the sum of current and expected future short real interest rates, measured
as deviations from the natural real interest rate. The latter is assumed to be








The nominal exchange rate is determined by a UIP relationship:
it − i
∗
t = st+1|t − st + ϕt, (11)
where ϕt is the shock to the foreign exchange rate risk premium. The
risk premium follows an AR(1) process:
ϕt+1 = γϕϕt + ξϕ,t+1. (12)
For simplicity, the Foreign country is not modelled as elaborately as the





















10Furthermore, foreign monetary policy is assumed to be conducted accord-
















it is the foreign monetary policy shock. The central bank sets
a nominal short-term interest rate to minimize the expected value of the
loss function given all information available at t.T h ep e r i o dt loss function
contains up to four arguments: domestic inﬂation squared, the output gap
squared, the interest rate squared and the change of the interest rate squared.
For simplicity, possible target levels for inﬂation, output and the interest rate
a r eh e n c es e tt oz e r o .T h ew e i g h t so nu pt ot h r e eo ft h ef o u ra r g u m e n t sc a n
be set to zero, i.e. output targeting, interest rate targeting and interest rate







t + ζ (it − it−1)
2 (16)





τLt+τ. Its choice of an optimal short interest rate can be formulated as
a linear regulator problem. The model can be rewritten in state-space form
and solved numerically for speciﬁcp a r a m e t e r sv a l u e su s i n gt h ea l g o r i t h m
presented in Oudiz and Sachs (1985). This is discussed in detail in Svensson
(2000).
In the discretionary monetary policy regime under consideration, the for-
ward looking variables xt =[ qt,ρt,πt+2,t] are linear functions of the prede-




t ,q t−1,i t−1, πt+1|t]. Hence,
xt = HXt where H is endogenously determined. The solution to the model
11includes, among other things, the optimal central bank reaction function. It
shows how the (short-term) interest rate is set as function of the predeter-
mined variables.
it = fXt (17)
The dynamics of the model imply that it takes time before monetary
policy aﬀects the economy. The short interest in period t is included in the
real interest variable ρt,w h i c ha ﬀects demand one period ahead. The output
gap in t +1in turn aﬀects inﬂation in t +2 . Hence, the short interest in
period t aﬀects inﬂation with a control lag of two periods.
Given the optimal interest rate rule and the resulting dynamics of the
model, it can be used to generate time series on e.g. interest diﬀerentials and
exchange rate changes.
4 Simulations
The model is solved numerically for each set of parameter values. By feed-
ing independent, normally distributed shocks into (7), (8), (9), (12), (13),
(14), and (15), time series on interest diﬀerentials and ex post exchange rate
changes can be generated. For each set of parameter values, 100 samples
of 100 observations are created. The standard UIP test in (1) is applied to
the simulated data and the average β−coeﬃcients are collected. The pur-
pose of this exercise is two-fold. First, we are interested in what ranges of
β−coeﬃcients that emerge from the model given realistic choices of para-
meter values. Second, since negative and large β−coeﬃcients are observed
12Table 1: Parameter estimates and ranges of realitistic values




LS (2000) 0.6 0.08 0.01 0.8 0.039 0.07 0.8 1
MC (1998) 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.0 2
RS (1998) - 0.14 - 0.91 - 0.1 - 3
OW (1999) - 0.31-0.39 - 0.47-0.77 - 0.23-0.4 - 4
BH (1999) - - - 0.8 0.2 0.5 - 5
PS (2000) - 0.11-0.33 - 0.89-0.94 - 0.1-0.12 - 6
FS (2000) 0.48 0.18 - - - 0.06 - 7
GR (2000) 0.71 0.13 - 0.88 - 0.09 - 8
range 0.48-0.71 0.08-0.39 0.01-0.1 0.47-0.94 0.039-0.2 0.06-0.5 0.0-0.8 9
empirically, we want to know what it takes to obtain negative and large
β−coeﬃcients from the model.
4.1 Choosing realistic parameter values















ξiϕ]. Svensson does not
estimate the open economy model but selects reasonable parameter values.
Table 1 shows his choices of parameter values and estimates from other stud-
ies using similar models. The ”realistic ranges” in the ﬁnal row are set from
t h es m a l l e s tt ot h el a r g e s tv a l u ee n c o u n t e r e d .T h i si sd o n et oa v o i dc o m p l e t e
arbitrariness in the choice of parameter values; the procedure does not aspire
to be highly scientiﬁc. Alternative parameter values are taken from Meredith
and Chinn (1998), (MC in Table 1), Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), (RS),
Orphanides and Wieland (1999), (OW), Batini and Haldane (1999), (BH),
Smets (2000), (FS), and Rudebusch (2000), (GR).
απ captures the weight on lagged inﬂation relative to expected future
13inﬂation in the Phillips curve in (7). The latter enters with a coeﬃcient 1−απ,
i.e. the coeﬃcients on lagged and expected inﬂation sum to one. The smaller
απ is, the more important are rational inﬂation expectations or the more
forward looking is the Phillips curve. απ has been set to zero (McCallum,
1997) as well as to one (Ball, 1999; Svensson 1997) within this class of models.
Svensson (2000) and Meredith and Chinn (1998) use απ =0 .6. Rudebusch
(2000) obtains a point estimate of 0.71. The smallest empirical estimate in
Table 1, 0.48, is taken from Smets (2000).
αy is the eﬀect of the output gap on inﬂation. The largest parameter
value here, 0.39, stems from Orphanides and Wieland (2000). They estimate
Phillips curves for the United States and the EURO area. The Svensson
(2000) choice, 0.08, constitutes the lower boundary for the range of realistic
values.
αq and βq are the open economy parameters, capturing the eﬀects of the
real exchange rate on supply and demand. For the United States, the real
exchange rate is often found to have insigniﬁcant eﬀects on inﬂation and
output, i.e. αq and β
q are zero. For other large economies, they are typically
signiﬁcant but small. Meredith and Chinn (1998) set these coeﬃcients to 0.1
based on the IMFs model MULTIMOD for the G7 countries. Svensson uses
0.01 for both αq and βq.
The output gap is highly autocorrelated in all studies. Smets (2000) ob-
tain the highest value of β
y, 0.94. The Orphanides and Wieland (1999) value
of 0.47 constitutes the lower bound of β
y. It turns out that β
y is one of the
most important parameters for the results from the UIP tests. The auto-
correlation of the foreign output gap, β
∗
y,on the other hand, hardly matters
14at all given the rudimentary model of the foreign country. Here, Svensson’s
value of β
∗
y, 0.8, is used throughout.
β
ρ is the interest rate sensitivity of demand. This is the main channel
through which monetary policy aﬀects the economy. The smallest value,
0.06, is taken from Smets (2000), closely followed by Svensson’s choice of
0.07. Meredith and Chinn (1998) and Batini and Haldane (1999) use 0.5,
which is the upper border of the range of realistic parameter values for β
ρ.




y, have not been estimated in
(these) other studies. f∗
π and f∗
y a r et h ew e i g h t so ni n ﬂation and output in
the foreign Taylor rule and γ∗
π, and γ∗
y are the autocorrelation coeﬃcients of
foreign supply and demand shocks. As these parameters are inconsequential
for the β-coeﬃcients, the Svensson values are used throughout: f∗
π =1 .5,
f∗
y =0 .5, γ∗
π =0 .8, and γ∗
y =0 .8.
γϕ is the autocorrelation of the shocks to the risk premium. As exchange
rate risk premia are unobservable, their autocorrelation is not easily esti-
mated. The upper and lower boundaries are taken from Svensson, who sets
this parameter to 0.8, and Meredith and Chinn (1998), who use a value of
0.0. Finally, the model contain seven shocks: A cost-push supply shock εt,a
productivity shock ηn
t ,d e m a n ds h o c kηd
t, a foreign supply shock ε∗
t,af o r e i g n
demand shock η∗
t, a foreign monetary policy shock ξ
∗
it and a risk premium
shock ξϕ. The default value for the variances of all these shocks is 1.0.
It turns out that what matters most for the β−coeﬃcients is the rela-
tive importance of the contemporaneous dynamics versus the intertemporal
dynamics of the model. The intertemporal dynamics determines the time
proﬁle of the eﬀects of lagged shocks. These movements are predictable
15g i v e nt h ei n f o r m a t i o ni nt and therefore necessarily consistent with UIP. The
contemporaneous dynamics shows how the variables respond to new shocks.
Only the latter, unexpected movements can be inconsistent with UIP. There-
fore, large values of the parameters capturing the contemporaneous eﬀects,
αy,αq,βρ and βq, relative to the values of the intertemporal parameters like
β
y tends to create a small or negative β−coeﬃcient. A notable feature of the
Svensson (2000) choice of parameters is that they constitute the lower bound
for the realistic ranges for all the contemporaneous parameters except β
ρ,
where his choice 0.07 is slightly higher than Smets’ 0.06. Using the Svens-
son (2000) parameter values as default therefore biases the β−coeﬃcients
towards unity. The simulation results would appear much less supportive of
the UIP hypothesis if e.g. the Meredith and Chinn (1998) parameter values
were used as benchmark.
4.2 Shocks to the exchange rate risk premium
Given previous results in McCallum (1994) and Meredith and Chinn (1998),
the endogenous response of monetary policy to risk premium shocks appears
to be the primary vehicle for generating negative β−coeﬃcients in the stan-
dard UIP test. Therefore, this mechanism is ﬁrst isolated by feeding only risk
premium shocks into the model. The results from this exercise are shown in
Table 2. When there is only one shock, its variance does not matter for the
results. Hence, σ2
ξiϕ is set to 1.0 throughout Table 2.
The ﬁrst row in Table 2 contains the parameter values used by Svensson
(2000). Given only risk premium shocks, the model generates a very small
but positive β−coeﬃcient (0.056). In rows 2 to 11, one parameter at a time
16Table 2: β−coeﬃcents given only shocks to the risk premium
βα π αy αq β
y β
q β
ρ γϕ λ µ row
0.056 0.6 0.08 0.01 0.8 0.039 0.07 0.8 0.5 1.0 1a
0.160 0.48 ··· · · · · · 2
0.202 · 0.39 ·· · · · · · 3
0.208 ·· 0.1 ··· · · · 4
-0.099 ··· 0.47 ·· · · · 5
0.153 ··· 0.94 ·· · · · 6
-0.178 ···· 0.2 ·· · · 7
0.051 ···· · 0.06 ···8
0.050 ···· · 0.5 ···9
0.201 ···· · · 0.0 ·· 10
0.022 ···· · · · 1.0 · 11
-0.352 0.6 0.08 0.01 0.47 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.5 1.0 12
-1.981 0.6 0.08 0.1 0.47 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 13
-7.553 0.6 0.08 0.1 0.47 0.2 0.5 0.0 1.0 1.0 14
a These are the Svensson (2000) parameter values.
Dots imply that the Svensson (2000) values are used.
is varied from its smallest to its largest realistic value as deﬁned in Table 1.
Reducing the autocorrelation of demand, β
y, to 0.47 reduces the β−coeﬃcient
to -0.099 (row 2). Increasing β
y to 0.94 increases the β−coeﬃcient to 0.153
(row 3). Hence, the β−coeﬃcient appears to be decreasing in the autocorre-
lation of output in this case.
In row 4, the relative weight on lagged versus expected future inﬂation in
the Phillips curve, απ, is reduced to 0.48. This increases the β−coeﬃcient
to 0.16. Rows 5 and 6 show, perhaps surprisingly, that the magnitude of the
eﬀect of monetary policy on demand, β
ρ, has only a small and unsystematic
eﬀect on the results from the UIP tests. Increasing β
ρ to 0.5 or decreasing
it to 0.06 result in small reduction in the β−coeﬃcient to 0.050 and 0.051.
In row 7, the eﬀect of the output gap on inﬂation, αy, is increased to 0.39.
17This increases the β−coeﬃcient to 0.202.
Next, we come to the open economy parameters αq, the eﬀect of the real
exchange rate on inﬂation, and β
q, the eﬀect of the real exchange rate on
demand. Variations in these two parameters turn out to have major eﬀects on
the results from the UIP tests. Increasing αq to 0.1 results in a β−coeﬃcient
of 0.208. The same operation for the eﬀect of the real exchange rate on
demand, β
q, yields the ﬁrst negative β−coeﬃcient, -0.065, in row 8.
Rows 10 and 11 show that reducing the autocorrelation of the exchange
rate risk premium to 0 increases the β−coeﬃcient to 0.208 and increasing
the relative weight on output stabilization, λ, from 0.5 to 1.0 decreases the
β−coeﬃcient to 0.022.
The ﬁn d i n g si nr o w s1t o1 1o fT a b l e2s u g g e s tt h a tas m a l l e ra u t o c o r r e -
lation of output and a larger eﬀect of the real exchange rate on demand are
the main measures that result in substantial reductions of the β−coeﬃcient
from the UIP tests. Furthermore, a smaller weight on lagged versus expected
future inﬂation in the Phillips curve, a smaller eﬀect of the real exchange rate
on inﬂation, a larger eﬀect of the real interest rate on demand and higher rel-
ative disutility of output variations also appear to decrease the β−coeﬃcient.
Several of these eﬀects have to be combined to get β−coeﬃc i e n tt h a ta r en e g -
ative and large. Combining three of them, reducing the autocorrelation of
demand, increasing the interest sensitivity of demand and the real exchange
rate sensitivity of demand results in a coeﬃcient of -0.274 (row 12). Row 13
demonstrates how to obtain the smallest value of β given parameters values
within the realistic ranges as deﬁned in Table 1. It turns out to be -1.75.
Increasing the relative weight on output variability in the central bank’s loss
18function, λ, to 1.0 quickly pulls the β−coeﬃcient down further to -7.233 (row
14). Hence, when only shocks to the risk premium are fed into the model, it
can easily generate large and negative β-coeﬃcients. This result is consistent
with the original McCallum (1994) model.
4.3 Demand and supply shocks
Next, the model is simulated with only demand shocks (Table 3). Given the
Svensson parameter values in row 1 of Table 3, a β−coeﬃcient of 0.972 is
o b t a i n e d .T h es a m ep r o c e d u r ei sf o l l o w e dh e r ea sf o rt h es h o c k st ot h er i s k
premium, i.e. one parameter at a time is varied between the highest and
lowest realistic values from Table 1. Then, all eﬀects in favor of small or
negative β−coeﬃcients are combined to see how small values the model is
capable of generating.
Changing the autocorrelation of output, β
y,f r o m0 . 4 7t o0 . 9 4i n c r e a s e s
the β−coeﬃcient to 0.978 and 0.991, respectively (rows 2 and 3). Lowering β
y
always decreased the β−coeﬃcients in Table 2. Hence, diﬀerent mechanisms
appear to be at work in response to diﬀerent types of shocks. Lowering
απ to 0.48 decreases β slightly to 0.971 (row 4). Changing the eﬀect of
the interest rate on demand, β
r,t o0 . 0 6a n d0 . 5i n c r e a s e sβ to 0.975 and
0.997, respectively (rows 5 and 6). Increasing the eﬀect of the output gap
on inﬂation, αy, increases the β−coeﬃcient to 0.975 (row 7). As in Table 2,
increasing the eﬀect of the real exchange rate on demand, β
q, decreases the
β−coeﬃcient (row 8), while increasing the corresponding eﬀect on supply,
αq, increases it (row 9). Increasing the relative weight on output gap in the
loss function decreases β−coeﬃcient very little, at the fourth decimal (row
1911).
The main conclusion from Table 3, where only demand shocks are fed
into the model, is that the data are consistent with UIP. The β−coeﬃcients
in the ﬁrst column deviate only marginally from unity.
Table 3: β−coeﬃcents given only demand shocks
βα π αy αq β
y β
q β
r γϕ µ λ row
0.972 0.6 0.08 0.01 0.8 0.039 0.07 0.8 1.0 0.5 1a
0.971 0.48 ···· · · · · 2
0.975 · 0.39 ··· · · · · 3
1.038 ·· 0.1 ·· · · · · 4
0.978 ·· · 0.47 ·· · · · 5
0.991 ·· · 0.94 ·· · · · 6
0.961 · ··· 0.1 ·· · · 7
0.975 · ···· 0.06 ···8
0.997 · ···· 0.5 ···9
0.953 · ···· · 0.0 ··10
0.972 · ···· · · · 1.0 11
0.928 0.5 0.1 0.005 0.8 0.164 0.018 0.8 1.0 0.5 12
a These are the Svensson (2000) parameter values.
Dots imply that the Svensson (2000) values are used.
The β−coeﬃcients when only the two types of supply shocks are fed into
the model are similar to those found in Table 3, i.e. the simulated data
on exchange rate changes and interest diﬀerentials are consistent with UIP.
Hence, it is primarily the endogenous response to exchange rate risk premium
shocks that generates ex post deviations from UIP in the Svensson (2000)
model.
204.4 The full model I: Baseline objective function
Next, the full model is simulated by generating independent normally dis-
tributed random values for all seven shocks. Table 5 shows the resulting
β−coeﬃcients for diﬀerent choices of parameter values. Now, the relative
variances of the shocks matter. In the benchmark case, all shocks have unity
variances.
Table 4: β−coeﬃc e n t sf o rt h ef u l lm o d e l
βα π αy αq β
y β
q β
r γϕ µ λ row
0.685 0.6 0.08 0.01 0.8 0.039 0.07 0.8 1.0 0.5 1a
0.588 0.48 ·· · · · · · · 2
0.824 · 0.39 ·· · · · · · 3
0.936 ·· 0.1 ·· · · · · 4
0.454 ··· 0.47 ·· · · · 5
1.016 ··· 0.94 ·· · · · 6
0.665 ··· · 0.1 ·· · ·7
0.722 ··· · · 0.06 ···8
0.755 ··· · · 0.5 ···9
0.967 ··· · · · 0.0 ··10
0.630 ··· · · · · · 1.0 11
0.281 0.48 ·· 0.47 0.1 ·· · · 12
-0.931 0.1 0.08 0.01 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.9 1.0 1.0 13
-0.082 ◦◦◦Var(εt)= 0 .1 ◦◦ ◦ ◦ 14
0.249 ◦◦◦Var(ηd
t)= 0 .1 ◦◦ ◦ ◦ 15
0.488 ◦◦◦Var(ηs
t)= 0 .1 ◦◦ ◦ ◦ 16
-1.196 ◦◦◦ Var(ξϕ,t)= 1 0 ◦◦ ◦ ◦ 17
a These are the Svensson (2000) parameter values.
Dots imply that the Svensson (2000) values are used.
For the parameter values used by Svensson (2000), the β−coeﬃcient is
0.685. This established model of endogenous monetary policy in an open
economy hence generates considerable deviations from UIP. The β−coeﬃcient
21in the benchmark case is however positive and larger than typical empirical
ﬁndings.
As in Table 2, the autocorrelation of the domestic output gap is one of
the most important parameters for the results in terms of the β−coeﬃcients
from the UIP tests. In row 2, β
y is reduced from the Svensson choice 0.8 to
the 0.47 of Orphanides and Wieland (2000). The β−coeﬃcient then falls to
0.454. Increasing β
y to 0.94 increases the β−coeﬃcient to 1.016.
Focusing instead on the eﬀect of lagged versus expected future inﬂation in
the Phillips curve, απ, decreasing it to 0.48 reduces the β−coeﬃcient to 0.588
(row 4). Rows 5 and 6 again show that changing the eﬀect of the real interest
rate on demand only aﬀects the β−coeﬃcient marginally. Decreasing β
ρ to
0.06 from the Svensson choice 0.07 reduces the β−coeﬃcient slightly to 0.722.
Increasing it to 0.5 increases the β−coeﬃcient to 0.755. Increasing αy,the
eﬀect of the output gap on inﬂation, to 0.39 increases the β−coeﬃcient to
0.824.
As in Table 2, the open economy parameters αq and β
q have large eﬀects
on the β−coeﬃcient. Increasing β
q from the Svensson 0.01 to 0.1 reduces
the β−coeﬃcient to 0.665 (row 8). The same operation on the supply side,
increasing αq, increases the β−coeﬃcient to 0.936 (row 9). Finally, reduc-
ing the autocorrelation of the risk premium shocks, γϕ, to 0.0 increases the
β−coeﬃcient to 0.967 and increasing the relative disutility of output varia-
tions, λ, reduces it to 0.630 (row 11).
Again, more than one parameter at a time has to be changed relative
to the Svensson (2000) benchmark for small or negative β−coeﬃcients to
emerge from the model. In row 12, all the diﬀerent eﬀects that work in favor
22of small β−coeﬃcients are combined, i.e. the β−coeﬃcient is (informally)
minimized given the constraint that the parameter values must be within
the realistic ranges as deﬁned in the ﬁnal row of Table 1. This results in a
β−coeﬃcient of 0.281, which is obviously small but still positive.
Negative β−coeﬃcients can be generated from the full Svensson (2000)
model in several ways. First, values outside the realistic ranges as deﬁned
in Table 1 can be assigned to some key parameters. For instance, reducing
the autocorrelation of the output gap, β
y,t o0 . 1 ,i n c r e a s i n gt h ee ﬀect of
t h er e a le x c h a n g er a t eo nd e m a n d ,β
q, to 0.2 and setting λ,t h er e l a t i v e
disutility of output variability in the central bank loss function, to 1.0 yields
a β−coeﬃcient of -0.931 (row 13).
A second measure that may result in negative β−coeﬃcients in the full
model is to alter the relative variances of the shocks. This is illustrated in
r o w s1 4t o1 7 .T h er e m a i n i n gp a r a m e t e r sa r et h es a m eh e r ea si nr o w1 2 ,i . e .
the combination of values that result in the smallest β−coeﬃcient given the
restriction that they belong to the realistic ranges as deﬁned in Table 1.
In row 14, the variance of the cost push supply shocks is reduced to 0.1.
The β−coeﬃcient is then reduced to -0.082. Reducing the variance of the
demand shocks to 0.1 instead increases the β−coeﬃcient to 0.249 (row 15).
Reducing the variance of the exchange rate risk premium shocks to 0.1 results
in a β−coeﬃcient of 1.023 (row 16). When the variance of the risk premium
shocks is set ten times as large as the other variances (row 17), we get a
β−coeﬃcient that can be classiﬁed as negative and large (-1.196 in row 16).
Given the high variance of the shocks to the risk premium, the Svensson
model is very similar to the Meredith and Chinn (1998) model in this case.
23They use almost identical parameter values and obtain a β−coeﬃcient of
-0.8 for short-term interest rates.
The main impression from Table 5 is that for realistic parameter values,
the Svensson (2000) model typically generates β−coeﬃcients that are below
unity but positive. The benchmark model with the Svensson (2000) parame-
ter values can however be considered biased towards the unity β−coeﬃcient
implied by UIP. As discussed in Section 4, he uses small values for the pa-
rameters working in favor of large deviations from UIP (β
q, β
r)a n dal a r g e
value of β
y, all of which tends to produce data that are consistent with UIP.
Negative β−coeﬃcients can be obtained from the model if the relative vari-
ances are altered or a very small value is assigned to the autocorrelation
of output. The smallest β−coeﬃcient that can be generated using realistic
parameter values and unity variances is 0.28.
4.5 The full model II: Interest rate smoothing
In the previous section, the central bank stabilized inﬂation and output, i.e.
the objective function in (16) had non-zero coeﬃcients on the ﬁrst two terms
only. This is the baseline formulation in Svensson (2000). There is however
ample evidence that central banks also stabilize nominal interest rates, im-
plying that the fourth coeﬃcient ζ in (16) is positive as well. It turns out
that the β−coeﬃcients in the standard UIP test on simulated data from the
Svensson (2000) model change drastically when interest rate smoothing is
introduced. Table 5 shows the results from repeating the exercise of the pre-
vious section when the central bank not only stabilizes inﬂation and output
but also avoids drastic changes of the nominal interest rate.
24Table 5: β−coeﬃc e n t sf o rt h ef u l lm o d e l
βα π αy αq β
y β
q β
r γϕ ζλ row
0.744 0.6 0.08 0.01 0.8 0.039 0.07 0.8 1.0 0.5 1a
0.461 0.48 · · ··· · 1.0 · 2
0.934 · 0.39 · ··· · 1.0 · 3
NC ·· 0.1 ··· · 1.0 · 4
0.509 ··· 0.47 ·· · 1.0 · 5
0.835 ··· 0.94 ·· · 1.0 · 6
0.757 ···· 0.1 ·· 1.0 · 7
0.837 ···· · 0.06 · 1.0 · 8
0.765 ···· · 0.5 · 1.0 · 9
0.994 ···· · · 0.0 1.0 · 10
0.734 ···· · · · 1.0 1.0 11
-0.216 0.48 ·· 0.47 0.1 0.5 · 1.0 · 12
-1.033 0.48 0.39 · 0.47 0.1 0.5 0.9 1.0 · 13
-1.247 0.48 0.39 · 0.47 · 0.5 0.9 1.0 · 14
-1.344 0.48 0.39 · 0.47 0.1 0.5 0.9 1.0 1.0 15
-1.840 ◦◦◦◦ Var(ξϕ,t) =10 ◦◦◦16
a These are the Svensson (2000) parameter values.
Dots imply that the Svensson (2000) values are used.
Cirkels (◦) imply that the values are the same as in the previous row.
NC implies that the model did not converge for this set of parameter values.
Rows one to eleven in Table 5 are similar to the corresponding results in
T a b l e4 .V a r y i n go n ep a r a m e t e ra tt h et i m ef r o mt h eS v e n s s o n( 2 0 0 0 )b e n c h -
mark values generates β−coeﬃcients between 0.6 and 1.0. The interesting
diﬀerences between interest rate smoothing and inﬂation/output stabilization
appear in rows 12 to 18. Here, it is clear that as soon as several parame-
ter at a time are altered from the Svensson values to other realistic values,
negative β−coeﬃcients emerge. In row 12, four changes are made relative to
the Svensson (2000) set of parameter values in row one: The autocorrelation
of inﬂation is decreased to 0.48, the autocorrelation of output is decreased
25to 0.47, the eﬀect of the interest rate on output is increased to 0.5, and the
eﬀect of the real exchange rate on output is increased to 0.1. This results
in a β−coeﬃcient of -0.216. Increasing the autocorrelation of the exchange
rate risk premium from 0.8 to 0.9 lowers the β−coeﬃcient further to -1.03 in
row 13. In contrast to previous results in this paper, a smaller eﬀect of the
exchange rate on output, β
q,p r o d u c e sa ne v e nl o w e rc o e ﬃcient (-1.24 in row
14). Hence, negative and large β−coeﬃcients can easily be generated from
the model given realistic parameter values when the central bank engages in
interest rate smoothing.
A second diﬀerence relative to the results for output and inﬂation stabi-
lization is that altering the relative variances of the shocks does not have as
drastic eﬀects on the β−coeﬃcient. Row 16 shows that it drop moderately
from -1.3 to -1.8 when the variance of the exchange rate risk premium is
scaled up by a factor ten relative to the variances of the other shocks. Other
changes of the variances have even smaller eﬀects on the β−coeﬃcient.
5 Impulse response functions
Why does the Svensson model of endogenous monetary policy in an open
economy generate data on interest diﬀerentials and exchange rate changes
that are inconsistent with UIP? Because we cannot solve the model analyt-
ically, it is not possible to analyze the expression for the ex post covariance
in response to speciﬁc shocks as in McCallum (1994) for shocks to the for-
eign exchange risk premium or Alexius (2000) for demand shocks. However,
the response of interest rates, exchange rate changes, output and inﬂation to
26diﬀerent shocks for diﬀerent parameter values shed some light on this issue.
The mechanism behind the negative β−coeﬃcients is similar to what is
described by Meredith and Chinn (1998). First, there is a shock to the
exchange rate risk premium in (12). Through the modiﬁed UIP relationship
(11), this depreciates the nominal and hence real exchange rate given that
the central bank does not respond be raising the interest rate. However,
because the weak exchange rate increases output as well as inﬂation, the
central bank will raise the interest rate. Hence, there will be a depreciation
and a positive interest diﬀerential in period t. However, in future periods,
the exchange rate appreciates again but the interest rate remains high. This
is where negative β−coeﬃcients may emerge. Depending on the parameter
values, the mechanism can be more or less pronounced.
Figures one to three shows three sets of impulse response functions for
the parameter values in row 1 table 4, row 12, table 4, and row 15, table 5.
The pattern is the similar in all three sets of impulse response functions.
The exchange rate initially appreciates and then depreciates. In ﬁgure 3,
however, it appreciates only upon impact in period 0. The interest rate is
increased and then falls back. The initial hike is much smaller when the cen-
tral bank engages in interest rate smoothing. There are generally conﬂicting
movements in output and inﬂation - output falls and inﬂation increases. The
reason is that the central bank eﬃciently removes any non-conﬂicting move-
ments. If both inﬂation and output tend to increase, the monetary policy is
tightened to push both variables back. We observe movements only to the
extent that output and inﬂation move in opposite direction and the central
bank is unable to counteract both movements. The negative β−coeﬃcients
27stem from the time period when the exchange rate is appreciating while the
interest rate is still higher than the foreign interest rate.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Tentative evidence indicates that the empirical failure of UIP is conﬁned to
short-term interest rates (Alexius, 2001, Meredith and Chinn, 1998). Short-
term interest rates diﬀer from other ﬁnancial assets in that they constitute
the main monetary policy instrument in most industrialized countries with
ﬂexible exchange rates. According to a relatively unexplored approach to
t h ee x c h a n g er a t er i s kp r e m i u mp u z z l e ,t h eo b s e r v e dex post deviations from
UIP stem from the co-movements of exchange rate changes and interest rate
diﬀerentials as monetary policy responds to shocks.
This paper investigates whether an established open economy macro model
with endogenous monetary policy can explain the exchange rate risk premium
puzzle. Data on interest diﬀerentials and exchange rate changes are gener-
ated from the Svensson (2000) open economy model. UIP is tested on the
artiﬁcial time series and the resulting β−coeﬃcients are collected. The values
of the model parameters are then varied systematically in order to identify
the conditions under which the model produces substantial deviations from
UIP.
The β−coeﬃcients that emerge from the Svensson (2000) model are typ-
ically smaller than the unity coeﬃcient expected from UIP, but positive. For
the benchmark parameter values used by Svensson (2000), the β-coeﬃcient is
0.68. However, the Svensson (2000) choices of key parameters are frequently
28small relative to other estimates. The model produces more substantial de-
viations from UIP if larger values are assigned to some of the parameters.
The smallest β−coeﬃcient obtained given parameter values within the range
of previous empirical estimates (as well as unity variances for all shocks) is
0.28.
Negative β−coeﬃcients can be obtained from the benchmark Svensson
(2000) model either by changing the variances of the shocks from their unit
values or by choosing small values for a few key parameters that control the
intertemporal dynamics of the model. If the variance of the cost push supply
shocks is reduced to 0.1, a β−coeﬃcient of -0.08 emerges. Reducing the
variance of the demand shocks as well as the cost push supply shocks lowers
it further to -0.19.
In the benchmark Svensson (2000) model, the central bank cares about
stabilizing inﬂation and the output gap. If it also stabilizes the nominal in-
terest rate, the mechanism that may generate negative β−coeﬃcients in the
standard UIP test is enhanced. With interest rate smoothing, negative and
large β−coeﬃcients (around -1.3) emerge from the model given parameter
values that are within the realistic ranges. Altering the relative variances of
the shocks or choosing parameter values outside of the realistic ranges how-
ever does not result in substantial additional reductions of the β−coeﬃcient.
For instance, increasing the variance of the exchange rate risk premium ten-
fold only brings it down to -1.8.
Most attempts to explain the exchange rate risk premium puzzle employ
partial equilibrium, microeconomic ﬁnance models. Exchange rates and in-
terest diﬀerentials can however rewardingly be analyzed as two endogenous
29variables within an open economy macro model. This paper demonstrates
that the co-movements of interest diﬀerentials and exchange rate changes
as they respond to shocks can in principle create negative β−coeﬃcients in
standard UIP tests.
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Figure 2 a and b: Impulse responses to a unit shocks to the exchange rate risk premium, small 
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Figure 3 a and b: Impulse responses to a unit shocks to the exchange rate risk premium. 
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